This article explores what contracts in the field of social policy can reveal about the forms of social solidarity that exist today. Taking workfare as its point of departure, the aim is to shed light on what these "social policy contracts" can tell us about the nature of social cohesion in contemporary Western societies. Drawing on Emile Durkheim's typology of social solidarity in
Introduction
A country is at its best when the bonds between people are strong and when the sense of national purpose is clear. Today the challenges facing Britain are immense. Our economy is overwhelmed by debt, our social fabric is frayed and our political system has betrayed the people. But these problems can be overcome if we pull together and work together. If we remember that we are all in this together. 2 In a recent article, Gerard Delanty argues that there is an 'emerging crisis of solidarity' within Europe.
3 While this concerns the question of peoplehood, and is most clearly expressed in the form of 'increased levels of anxiety around migration in European countries', its roots, according to Delanty, can be traced to changes in the socio-economic constitution of Europe and its nation states. Referring to the work of several sociologists, including that of Richard Sennett and Jock Young, Delanty charts a variety of social and economic transformationsincluding in work, the family, and pensions -that have contributed to the weakening of previously solid bases of solidarity within Europe, including status and class. Lacking any sense of a collective identity at the European level, the result is a crisis of solidarity that, in turn, produces a 'fear of others', most prominently of migrants and members of ethnic communities.
For Delanty, the way forward must involve a reassertion of the commitment to the social justice With the rise to prominence of the cult of the consumer and the idea that consumers, rather than the state, should provide for their own care needs, there has been a simultaneous diminution in what the social state offers by way of welfare benefits to those requiring assistance. In Bauman's view, this decline in 'communally endorsed, collective insurance against individual misfortune' detrimentally affects solidarity as it removes one of its key sources. This type of insurance was designed to promote solidarity by creating the possibility of a society understood as 'a common good, shared, communally owned, and jointly cared for, thanks to the defence it provides against the twin horrors of misery and indignity …'.
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This theme of a crisis of, or at least a steady decline in, solidarity in contemporary Europe that appears in the social scientific literature, raises some important questions: Does this mean that there is no solidarity to speak of today? Is the only way to restore solidarity, if indeed that is achievable, to seek a return to the Keynesian era with its emphasis on full employment and and it is not the purpose of this article to address them in any detail, if at all. Rather, the objective here is to question the assumption that there exists a general crisis of solidarity in what will loosely be referred to as contemporary Western states. Or, to be more precise, while the foregoing analysis may be correct in identifying a crisis of solidarity insofar as the traditional sources of solidarity are in the process of disintegrating, this does not mean that alternative sources of solidarity are not emerging to take their place. It is with these possible alternative sources of solidarity that this article is concerned.
The article takes the prominent role of contract within the field of social policy today as its point of departure. Contract has become a key mechanism through which social policies, including the traditional assistance offered to citizens via the welfare state, are implemented.
These contracts between the state (or one of its representative institutions) and its citizens place duties upon the latter, whether that be actively to seek employment, engage in training and educational programmes, or behave in a manner complying with prevailing social norms. It is only on the basis of undertaking such duties satisfactorily that citizens will continue to reap the benefits of the social, or welfare, state. As such, and unlike the social rights of the post-WWII political settlement identified by T.H. Marshall, 7 these contracts point not to unconditional entitlements of access to the benefits of the welfare state, but to a conditional system, in which such access may be denied for failure to comply with the state's stipulations.
These social policy contracts, as they will be referred to here, provide a useful lens through which to analyse contemporary forms of social solidarity. This is because these contracts act as 7 T.H. Marshall, 'Citizenship and Social Class' in T.H. Marshall and T. Bottomore, Citizenship and Social Class (1992) .
an integral component of today's welfare state -that part of the state whose steady retrenchment is frequently identified in the social science literature as being a key contributory factor in the aforementioned crisis of solidarity. In other words, a focus on these contracts will allow us to chart more clearly the transformation in the sources of solidarity within an institution traditionally defined by its solidarity-producing properties.
Largely through an analysis of one such contract -the workfare contract 8 -it will be argued that it is possible to identify two forms of social solidarity or social cohesion. In order to conceptualise these, the article will draw upon some of Émile Durkheim's work -both his typology of social solidarity in The Division of Labour in Society 9 and his later work on the notion of individualism. It will be suggested that, despite existing within social and economic conditions markedly different to those by reference to which Durkheim developed his analysis of social solidarity, today's workfare contract points to the existence of two forms of social solidarity that have much in common with Durkheim's mechanical and organic social solidarity.
More specifically, this contract contains within it both punitive and restitutive elements, measures designed both to exclude and include those members of the population in need of assistance. In turn, these exclusionary and inclusive measures assist in producing social solidarity. It is argued, therefore, that the workfare contract reveals something important about the nature and sources of contemporary social solidarity or cohesion in social and economic conditions different to those which Delanty and Bauman describe as being the traditional breeding ground and host for solidarity. Consequently, it is not so much that there exists a crisis 8 Although reference will be made to other types of social policy contract too. 9 E. Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society (1984 Society ( [1893 ).
of solidarity today -sources of solidarity can be pinpointed in the post-Keynesian era, and interestingly within one of the key institutions (the welfare state) whose steady withdrawal has been identified as contributing to the suggested crisis. Rather, the issue, it is claimed here, is to seek to understand the forms that today's solidarity takes and how these particular forms of social cohesion assist in maintaining, and providing obstacles to the questioning and contestation of, the conditions necessary for, inter alia, ongoing poverty, hatred of others, insecure and poorly paid employment, and the misery and indignity Bauman speaks of. In other words, it is necessary not only to identify the possible forms and sources of social solidarity today, but also to analyse critically the ways in which these are involved in sustaining the types of human misery that exist in today's post-Keynesian world.
Contract, Workfare and Social Policy
Let us consider an example first. For some time now, many developed Western countries have managed the issue of unemployment through the policy of workfare. Workfare, or labour activation, as it is also known, is a social policy of conditional welfare. In order to continue receiving unemployment benefits, welfare recipients must undertake certain tasks which are designed to (re-)engage them in the world of work. Should they fail to undertake the stipulated tasks, their benefits may be reduced and, ultimately, withdrawn. Contract is the mechanism through which workfare operates. In the UK, for example, this contract takes the form of the (that is, the creation of 'a welfare state where virtually everyone is either looking for work or preparing for work'). 13 The overriding objective was to get people back into work, as work, the Government said, was the surest means of escaping poverty. In terms of contributing to reducing the unemployment figures, New Labour's policies were clearly a success. As the White
Paper notes, the number of people in work during the summer of 2008 in the UK was 29.5 million -an all-time high. Moreover, the number of people claiming welfare benefits at this time was fewer than one million, a clear improvement on the 1992 figure, which was almost three million. are free to determine the nature of their contractual obligations); consent (in other words, parties voluntarily enter into agreements rather than being coerced to do so); and reciprocity or mutuality (that both parties benefit from the contract through the mutual exchange of acts or promises). These principles represent an idea of social relations as based on freely agreed bargains between two contracting parties of equal power -in the workfare context, between the state (or its representative, such as the Job Centre) and the individual in need of assistance.
Moreover, they point to the empowerment of the contracting parties, as it is in their hands that decisions regarding the nature of their agreements lie. Theoretically, the parties are free to bargain and negotiate over the terms of their contracts, and the rights and obligations within these, with a view to ending up with an agreement that reflects their choices and wishes. The use of contract therefore facilitates the construction of a certain idea of social relations -an ideal scenario in which voluntary agreements are arrived at between parties of equal power.
The representation of workfare as a contract reflecting such principles has been criticised in the literature to such an extent that it is highly questionable whether the Jobseekers' Agreement, along with 'contracts' in other areas of social policy (such as acceptable behaviour contracts), is a contract at all. Peter Vincent-Jones, for instance, has argued that it is difficult to call this Agreement a contract as it complies poorly with a number of common contract norms, including reciprocity, consent, and choice. about the construction and resolution of social problems. Moreover, and as we shall see, the use of contract allows a concentration on individuals' obligations, and the consequences that flow from their breach. Whether or not these 'contracts' can be said to involve reciprocity, bargaining etc. and thus amount to proper contracts, their real purchase lies in the assumption that the citizens subject to them have made an agreement and that they have an obligation to stick to it. This symbolic power of contract points to an understanding of 'the rhetoric of contract' which is different to that of the 'this does not meet the threshold contract norms necessary for a contract' variety. For here, contract's rhetorical power resides in its ability to coincide with broader ideas and understandings of the nature of contemporary society. As John
Harrington has written in another context: 'As rhetoric, in the classical sense, relevant arguments gain in force from the plausibility of the visions of society by which they are underpinned.' 20 Underpinning the conceptualisation of social issues and problems as contracts, it is suggested here, is a plausible 'vision of [contemporary] society' -one defined, inter alia, by the importance of individual will and responsibility; the unacceptability of relying on the state to solve your problems; sticking by your agreements by undertaking your obligations; and individual empowerment. Contract within the field of social policy thus gains its force not from its compliance with standard contract norms -as most authors note, it is highly questionable whether social policy contracts are contracts in this sense -but from its ability to resonate with, and shore up, a powerful 'moral' vision of contemporary society, one which, as we shall see, succeeds in masking from view deeper structural issues. This is the power of contract to which the title of this article refers. With this in mind, let us now turn to consider what the workfare contract might reveal about contemporary forms of social solidarity.
The Workfare Contract and the Foundations of Social Solidarity
The What is interesting about Rosanvallon's analysis is the relationship he identifies between contract, social policy, and the reaffirmation of society (the construction of social bonds). In his view, the benefit of introducing contract into the field of social policy lies not only in reintegrating the particular individual into society and emphasising to him or her the importance of responsibility and honouring commitments, but in the reaffirmation of society which these two factors facilitate. Whereas a welfare state based on collective insurance merely provides individuals with the social right to access the means of subsistence, the corresponding right of today's welfare state exceeds this to incorporate 'a moral imperative' too -the right to be a socially useful member of society. As opposed to the right to subsistence, which Rosanvallon equates to passivity, the latter right is bound up with activity and the notion of active citizenship. In his view, this type of citizenship, and its corresponding right to social usefulness, forms the basis of a new type of contemporary solidarity. It results in the excluded (re-)engaging or participating in society and converts the welfare recipients of the system of collective insurance into citizens.
One of the consequences of Rosanvallon's argument is that it is by means of a focus on the individual that today's social solidarity is likely to come about. The source of social solidarity is, Rosanvallon is not alone in his analysis of the changing nature and purpose of today's social state. For instance, by reference to some of Michel Foucault's later work, Jacques Donzelot charts a shift from the welfare to the social investment state. 24 Unlike the traditional welfare state, which sought to compensate for the injustices produced by the operation of markets, the social investment state is designed to ensure that public funds are invested in training and educational programmes, like those associated with workfare, whose purpose is to produce individuals with the ability to enter and compete within these markets, and who, thereafter, will no longer require assistance from the state. In Donzelot's words: 'In short, social policy is no longer a means for countering the economic, but a means for sustaining the logic of The foregoing analyses point to both the changing nature and purposes of the welfare state, and the central role that contract plays in a major aspect of today's social policy. Specifically, they stress the emphasis on the need to invest public resources in individuals who act responsibly by actively striving to re-enter society and who, when they do so, will become useful, autonomous and self-reliant members of society who are unlikely to require access to public funds or to the programmes funded by the state in the future. bottom of the socio-economic hierarchy, this social insecurity, which often expresses itself in petty crime and social disorder, is dealt with by the penal arm of the state. This punitive response, however, also works as a way of managing the social insecurity increasingly experienced by the middle classes as governments succeed in converting the middle class disenchantment produced by the state's withdrawal on the social and economic fronts into impatience with the social and moral disorder perceived to be the way of life of petty criminals, single mothers, welfare recipients and other "irresponsible" groups. According to Wacquant, this punitive mode of governing social insecurity therefore lends much needed legitimacy to politicians, as it allows them to claim that they are working to maintain citizens' physical security or safety while simultaneously withdrawing the types of long-standing social safety nets traditionally associated with the welfare state. Meanwhile: [F] or the upper class as well as the society as a whole, the endless and boundless activism of the penal institution serves the symbolic mission of reaffirming the authority of the state and the newfound will of political elites to emphasize and enforce the sacred border between commendable citizens and deviant categories, the "deserving" and the "undeserving" poor, those who merit being salvaged and "inserted" (through the mix of sanctions and incentives) into the circuit of unstable wage labor and those who must henceforth be durably blacklisted and banished.
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Unlike Rosanvallon, for Wacquant workfare is a punitive measure that is implemented by governments as a way of reconciling the unemployed to the precarious and de-regulated labour market that is a feature of the neo-liberal era. Or, to put it another way, it represents a punitive inclusion into a labour market increasingly shorn of its social protections and benefits. But it is also clear from the earlier discussion in this article regarding the nature of workfare that the workfare contract incorporates an exclusionary element. The failure to abide by the terms of the Jobseekers' Agreement will result in a reduction in the amount of Jobseeker's Allowance, 30 Ibid., at xvii. and, should this persist, ultimately its withdrawal from the unemployed individual. It is suggested that the existence of this punitive exclusion, whereby the workfare contract entertains the prospect of the de-socialisation of citizens by way of the deprivation of material assistance, also maps onto the types of Manichaeistic categories identified by Wacquant in the preceding quotation. Those who do not undertake their obligation to work or participate in work-related activity or training, will, like those in the previous system who were deemed to be quite content to live a life on benefits, no doubt be categorised as, inter alia, lazy, work-shy, shirking their responsibilities, and benefit fraudsters. The difference is that those who do not comply with this obligation are now effectively ejected from the realm of the social -'banished', to use Wacquant's phrase. The possibility of this ejection has important implications; for the ejectees to be sure, but also, it is suggested here, as a source of social solidarity or social cohesion. To implement the sanction of withdrawing material resources from citizens reaffirms society (in Rosanvallon's phrase). De-socialisation founds society. This exclusion not only reinforces the prevailing consensus around those deemed to be deserving and those who are not; it also ensures the perpetuation of a system that measures the strength of social cohesion by the extent to which certain core moral values or norms are upheld. These values or norms, it is suggested here, include respect, self-discipline, the work ethic, selfdependency rather than dependency on the state, and functioning as a useful, as opposed to useless, member of society. Thus, the punishment of those who fail to live up to such values or norms has the effect of re-emphasising these and helping to shore up the social solidarity to which they give rise. More than this, it demonstrates the vital role that stigma plays as a Page | 20 contemporary source of social solidarity or cohesion. 31 For the exclusionary element of the workfare contract feeds into a populist, morally loaded discourse regarding those who will not, or cannot, work. More often than not, this results in a process in which the failure to participate in work becomes associated, or synonymous, with particular groups or populations which are then often lumped together under generic descriptions such as 'useless' or 'a waste of space'.
Crucially, though, those who are punished for their failure to participate, are not entirely removed or excluded from society (for instance, by being imprisoned). While deprived of the resources necessary for their socialisation, they remain within the space of society and are thus still available as an outlet for the sustenance of the types of moralising discourses and categorisations upon which today's social cohesion, at least in part, depends.
The exclusionary component of workfare contracts, with its tendency to lead to the categorisation of parts of the population, therefore suggests that Rosanvallon's depiction of workfare as a policy focussed solely on individuals and their particular circumstances, does not tell the full story. Rather, it needs to be complemented by an acknowledgement that the grouping or classification of some parts of society forms an integral dimension of the workfare contract, and the social policy contract more generally. 32 Thus, at the very time the middle classes Wacquant speaks of are experiencing insecurity about their status and the possibility of its transmission to their offspring, the classification of others acts as a means of managing this 31 For more on the contemporary relationship between punishment and stigma, see Wacquant, op cit. 32 In the context of workfare, this process has been facilitated formally by the previous Labour Government's recent legislation on welfare (the Welfare Reform Act 2009), which extends workfare explicitly to lone mothers with children aged three or above, and to those on incapacity benefit deemed fit to work. Like others, the failure of those groups to participate in workfare schemes will lead to a reduction in, or withdrawal of, their welfare benefits. More generally, one need only think of anti-social behavior (also the subject of social policy contracts) and its association in the public imagination with the 'hoodie' or the 'chav' -'dangerous' young men considered to have nothing better to do than to make nuisances of themselves by disrupting the flow of civilised life.
insecurity. Thus, the firm treatment of single mothers, suspected benefit fraudsters (including those on incapacity benefit), and other 'deviant categories', via the welfare state and criminal justice system becomes the mechanism through which the status insecurity of the middle classes is mollified, if not solved. Indeed, as Bauman persuasively argues in his discussion of the term 'underclass', the tendency today to lump together a variety of different populationsinter alia, illegal immigrants, drug addicts, and single mothers -into one stigmatised class of poor people is, in itself, 'a classificatory decision':
Plunging them all into one category is a classificatory decision, not the verdict of facts; condensing them into one entity, charging them all, collectively, with uselessness and with harbouring awesome dangers to the rest of society, is an exercise in value-choice and evaluation, not a description ... In reality, 'single mother' and an 'underclass woman' are not the same creature. It takes a great deal of effort (though little thought) to make the first into the second.
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This class of the 'useless' and 'dangerous' is not a natural phenomenon, but a necessary construction; one designed to serve the purposes of those doing the constructing. In the argument presented in this article, it serves the need of social solidarity or cohesion. The identification and classification of specific target groups in the context of workfare feeds into, and reinforces, populist notions of those groups, and the idea that it is morally disingenuous to get something for nothing from the state. The emphasis placed upon classification thereby offers up an invaluable source of social solidarity at a time when the unstable nature of work for many renders employment a tentative foundation of social cohesion. The workfare contract comprises inclusive and exclusionary elements, both of which constitute important sources of contemporary social solidarity or social cohesion. As such, inherent in this contract one detects a dual foundation for the production of social bonds and, to use Rosanvallon's phrase, the reaffirmation of society. The inclusive element points not only to the importance of work as a way of (re-)socialising those in receipt of welfare benefits, but crucially, to the centrality of the individual to this process. It is with the individual's specific needs and biography, together with the objective of producing autonomous, responsible, and selfdisciplined citizens, that the workfare contract is concerned. And it is this 'contractual individualism' that acts as a key source of social solidarity today. On the other hand, and simultaneously, the bonds of society are strengthened through the possibility of excluding those who fail to undertake the obligations contained in the workfare contract. The desocialisation that flows from this exclusion paradoxically offers up a further source of reaffirming society, not least because of the tendency to classify those individuals into a larger, amorphous grouping of, to use Bauman's term, the useless. Such populist characterisations play a crucial role in reaffirming and strengthening the social bonds amongst respectable and upstanding citizens. The purpose of the following section is to reflect on how we might conceptualise this dual foundation of social solidarity inherent in today's workfare contract.
What, if anything, can this presence of the inclusive and the exclusionary tell us about the forms of social solidarity expressed through social policy today? Or, to put it another way, what conceptions of modes of integration within contemporary society are represented through the mechanism of both the workfare contract and social policy contracts more generally?
Durkheim and Social Solidarity
In order to answer these questions, it is possible to draw on Emile Durkheim's characterisations of social solidarity in The Division of Labour in Society. 34 While his thesis is well known, it is necessary to identify those key parts of it which are relevant to the argument to be pursued here. 35 For Durkheim, social solidarity meant the way in which societies were integrated or given cohesion. He argued that social solidarity had moral foundations -social solidarity gave expression to the underlying morality existing within identifiable historical communities.
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Moreover, he suggested that in order to determine the type of social solidarity, and thus morality, existing at any one time, one could turn to the law, as law expressed society's morality. Indeed, owing to the impossibility of measuring the moral phenomenon of social solidarity, it was necessary to have recourse to a symbolic entity such as law to gain insight into the extant forms of social solidarity. Today's social policy contracts point, however, in the direction of a second moral foundation of contemporary social solidarity. This has more in keeping with Durkheim's modern social solidarity. One can detect in social policy contracts a conception of social solidarity based not only on the need to respect individuals and their autonomy and human dignity, but on the expectation that these individuals will discharge their responsibility to society by undertaking the obligations stipulated in the relevant contract (to seek work, behave themselves etc.).
These contracts presuppose not the passive recipient of benefits, or indeed the passive citizen generally, but the active individual who, as we saw, Rosanvallon described as 'an autonomous, While not detracting from the utility of Durkheim's analysis of organic social solidarity for an understanding of today's social policy contracts, the former does not perfectly fit the latter.
Unlike Durkheim's thesis, the restitutive component of the social policy contract does not flow from the nature of the sanctions consequent upon its breach. Whereas Durkheim identified restitutive law with, for example, the payment of damages as a means of restoring the parties to their previous positions, it has already been noted how the sanctions for breach of social policy contracts take a punitive form. As such, the restitutive nature of these contracts does not relate to the breach, or failure to perform the terms, of these specific contracts. To what, then, does it correspond? To answer this, the social policy contract must be viewed as symbolic of a wider settlement or, we might say, contract. With respect to workfare, for instance, the restitutive element of the contracts associated with this lies in the objective of re-socialising the unemployed through work. This is the meaning to be ascribed to Durkheim's 'restoring the past, so far as possible, to its normal state' 43 in this context. It is in the mending of a more general social breakdown that restitution resides. And, as with Durkheim's later analysis of the roots of modern social solidarity, and Rosanvallon's inclusive society, it is individualism that forms the moral basis of that restitutive moment. Workfare schemes and programmes are set up by the state, to be sure. But, equally, it is through the individual -the active citizen -and the values associated with the individual, including autonomy, dignity, rights, self-discipline, and effort that social bonds are to be repaired and society reaffirmed. In other words, while today's social policy contracts do not map squarely onto Durkheim's notion of organic solidarity, the underlying moral foundation of his later idea of modern social solidarity -individualism -finds its direct expression in these contracts as a key basis upon which the re-socialisation of the unemployed is meant to occur. To deploy Rosanvallon's phraseology, it is by means of contractual individualism that the reaffirmation of society is made possible.
Despite its development in the context of distinct historical periods, Durkheim's analysis of the forms of social solidarity and their modes of expression can reveal something about the relationship between social policy and social solidarity today. Specifically, it illustrates the exclusionary (repressive) and inclusive (restitutive) aspects of social solidarity. And while Durkheim acknowledged that both could co-exist within a particular society (e.g. industrial society), either the exclusionary or the inclusive form tended to dominate. In the present context, we are confronted with a phenomenon in which the exclusionary and inclusive coexist. The social policy contract is synonymous not only with the restitutive role that Durkheim understood contract law to play in modern society (mending broken relationships). Rather, the social policy contract functions both restitutively and, at least potentially, repressively (its breach being punishable ultimately in the form of exclusion from access to the public goods provided by the state). Durkheim's analysis is also relevant insofar as he identifies social solidarity as having moral foundations. Again, his notions of individualism and the conscience collective are, it is argued, relevant to understanding the sources of social solidarity within contemporary social policy. The autonomous individual, whose rights and dignity demand respect and responsibilities to others and society require implementation, exists alongside an increasingly populist collective belief system whose reaffirmation depends upon the possible punishment of those who flout the values associated with individualism. Moreover, the constructed status of those individuals -their lumping together in a category defined, inter alia, by what Bauman calls "uselessness" -also works to strengthen the conscience collective, and, in turn, contemporary social solidarity. It is possible, then, to say that today's social policy contract symbolises elements of both the mechanical and organic social solidarities described by Durkheim, and his later reflections on the underlying moral basis of modern social solidarity.
Contract, Social Solidarity and De-Politicisation
The contention thus far has been that an analysis of the social policy contract, predominantly in the context of workfare, can help in understanding the forms of contemporary social solidarity.
In this, the final, section of the article, the discussion turns to the relationship between today's sources of social solidarity -both the populism of punishing and the individualism of the inclusive society -and the persistence of social suffering. Specifically, the objective is to demonstrate the masking properties of the social policy contract and, thus, of the forms of social solidarity which it expresses. What do they hide and leave unaddressed? And with what consequences? In order to concretise the discussion, reference will be made to that area of social policy that has formed the focal point so far -that is, unemployment and workfare. , the average chief executive of a FTSE company has gone from earning 17 times the UK average salary to earning 75.5 times it.
The nature of the labour market has also changed in recent years. In its report on vulnerable employment in the UK, the TUC Commission on Vulnerable Employment ('the Commission') notes that while, as we saw earlier, unemployment has fallen markedly over the last decade, this has occurred in the context of a changing economy. 51 Accompanying the shift from a 'manufacturing' to a 'service' based economy has been a rise in 'outsourcing' whereby workers are not directly employed by the businesses they work for, but by employment agencies who supply these businesses with labour. have, for example, neither security nor guarantee of work. 52 Drawing on various reports, Green notes three consequences of temporary work for those engaged in it: 1) a lack of job security compared to other workers, resulting in low levels of job satisfaction; 2) less pay than permanent employees with similar skills; and, 3) fewer benefits, including pensions.
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Importantly, the Commission discovered that it is increasingly likely for low paid workers who use Jobcentre Plus to be offered agency work.
As well as the increasing prevalence of low paid work, the Commission notes how the erosion of various forms of protection for workers from the 1980s onwards, such as collective agreements between employers and the unions, has contributed to the rise in vulnerable employment. This re-regulation of the labour market 54 was considered to be a necessary condition of the realisation of economic growth and prosperity, and while, according to the Commission, a variety of measures passed by New Labour stemmed the flow (e.g. working families tax credits), the OECD can still report that, save for the US, workers in the UK today are afforded the least protection in the developed world. Estimating the number of workers in the UK 'trapped in a continual round of low-paid and insecure work where mistreatment is the norm' to be around 2 million, the Getting a job was only the first step, said the chancellor, Gordon Brown. People should be helped to move upwards, to train, improve themselves and get promoted. But the vast majority are going nowhere. Armies of cleaners, carers, caterers, cashiers and clerical workers paid rock-bottom wages cannot all become supervisors and managers ... The ladder has limited capacity; most will stay more or less where they are; most will retire from the entry-level jobs they have worked at all their lives.
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One of the core implications of Carpenter et al's studies was the failure of current workfare social policies in the UK to address underlying structural inequalities, such as class, that affect people's employment trajectories after being on welfare.
The foregoing reports and empirical analyses assist in putting some flesh on the bones of Rosanvallon's 'inclusive society'. Importantly, they reveal a less rosy picture than that painted by his philosophical analysis, and point to key structural factors -such as class, poor education, and the low paid and precarious nature of the labour market -that impede the permanent and successful re-integration into society of many of those on workfare. What is secured through the assimilation characteristic of workfare is not necessarily an escape from poverty and the heightened possibility of de-socialisation that poverty engenders, but its entrenchment and ongoing production. The point here is that the workfare contract does not address the the 'moral' dimensions of unemployment and welfare -individualism and the classification of certain populations as useless, dangerous, etc. -and the social solidarity of which these are meant to act as sources, that have become most closely associated with contract in the context of social policy. This association pays great political dividends, lending much-needed legitimacy to governments seeking to justify their role in the light of having overseen the steady retrenchment of the welfare state (much like Wacquant's point, noted earlier, about the role of punitive measures today). But contract has this political effect in a manner which, ironically, is de-politicising. In other words, the moralising aspects of the social policy contract, and the (socially) cohesive ends to which they are directed, succeed in obscuring the underlying conflicts over the nature of the types of structural factors, noted above, that play such a central role in determining the prospects of the state's citizens. What kind of system produces the 'revolving door' syndrome and the precariousness that flows from this; why, in a system supposedly guided by equal opportunities for all, are those with greater qualifications more likely to be granted priority within workfare programmes? Answers to these questions demand the confrontation of issues and factors that the social policy contract is inadequately designed to address. For, rather than concerning 'moral' issues, they revolve around questions of, and conflicts over, inter alia, political economy, class, income inequality, education, and the bureaucratic compulsion to meet targets. But the particular power of contract here is not merely to obscure these questions and conflicts by converting them into 'moral' issues, but to prevent them even surfacing as questions and conflicts in need of airing and debate. order and consensus, not conflict, with which this type of contract is bound up. The result is that, because debate about the underlying systemic issues all but vanishes from the public and political spheres -their terrain colonised by a moralising discourse of autonomous individuals, responsibilisation, and anti-social behaviour -the underlying structural factors proceed unhindered, their operation continuing to produce the kinds of detrimental consequences for some citizens detailed in the empirical material set out above. Contract therefore masks and subdues in the field of social policy, its de-politicising character having important political purchase whilst ensuring the unimpeded production of debilitating social costs.
Conclusion
In contrast to those who argue that we are currently experiencing a crisis of solidarity, this article has suggested that different forms of social solidarity are emerging today through that institution -the welfare state -most frequently cited as evidence of the so-called crisis.
Durkheim's typology of social solidarity in The Division of Labour in Society, and his later work on individualism, provides a useful resource for thinking through the nature of these different forms -especially their moral foundations. But while the emerging forms of social solidarity detectable via today's social policy contracts may be different in nature to the "collective insurance" solidarity of the post-WWII welfare state, Durkheim's work demonstrates that they are by no means novel. Indeed, from the analysis conducted in this article, they are reversionary, replicating sources of social solidarity to be found in earlier, sometimes much earlier, societies. The argument pursued here has not only been that it is necessary to understand the nature of the emerging forms of social solidarity today, but, through that
